Recent Cases by unknown
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 17 
Issue 1 January 1952 Article 11 
1952 
Recent Cases 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Cases, 17 MO. L. REV. (1952) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol17/iss1/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Recent Cases
CRIMINAL LAW-ASSAULT WITH INTENT To KILL OR TO Do GREAT BODILY HARM-
SPECIFIC INTENT-POWER TO COMPEL DEFENDANT'S WIFE
TO TESTIFY OVER HIs OBJECTION
State v. Dunbar'
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Missouri presents two interesting
questions for consideration. Appellant shot his wife with a shotgun, causing
her serious and permanent injury. Upon a complaint signed by Mrs. Dunbar, an
information 2 was filed charging that apellant ". . . in and upon one Florence E.
Dunbar on purpose and of malice aforethought, wilfully and deliberately did make
an assault and did then and there . . . deliberately and feloniously shoot at her
... with the felonious intent then and there.., on purpose and of his malice afore-
thought, deliberately and feloniously to kill and murder contrary to the form of the
statute. ... " Appellant was found "guilty as charged in the information" and sen-
tenced to the state penitentiary for a term of thirteen years. On appeal to the
supreme court it was urged that instruction number ones was broader than the in-
formation since it authorized a verdict of guilty as charged in the information if the
jury found that appellant had made a malicious assault on his wife with intent
either to "kill and murder or do some great bodily harm." Division One of the
supreme court, Clark P. J., held that since the instruction "followed the words of
the statute" the inclusion of the words "or do some great bodily harm" did not
"vitiate" the instruction. However, the words do not follow the language of the
statute4 upon which the information and punishment was based, and although
1. 360 Mo. 788, 230 S.W. 2d 845 (1950).
2. The information is set out in full on page two of Respondent's Brief.
3. The instruction in full found on page 7 of Respondent's Brief: "The court
instructs the jury that if you believe and find from all of the evidence in this case
and beyond a reasonable doubt that on the 11th day of December, 1948, at and in
the county of Iron, State of Missouri, the defendant, Chester Dunbar, unlawfully,
willfully, feloniously on purpose and of his malice aforethought did make an assault
upon one Florence Dunbar with a shot-gun loaded with gunpowder and leaden balls
with the intent then and there, the said Florence Dunbar, on purpose and of his
malice aforethought, feloniously to kill and murder or do some great bodily harm.
You will find defendant guilty as he stands charged by the information in this
case, unless you find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity as explained
by other instructions herein given you. If you find the defendant guilty you will
fix his punishment therefor at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not
less than two years."
4. Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.180 (1949): "Assault with intent to kill.-Every
person who shall, on purpose and of malice aforethought, shoot at or stab another,
or assault or beat another with a deadly weapon, or by any other means or force
likely to produce death or great bodily harm, with intent to kill, maim, ravish or
rob such person, or in the attempt to commit any burglary or other felony, or in
resisting the execution of legal process, shall be punished by imprisonment in the
penitentiary not less than two years."
This section has often been called the "bloody statute" and the offense de-
scribed therein is popularly called "malicious assault" or "assault with malice."
1
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judgment was reversed on other grounds,6 there does seem to be an error in the
instruction which counsel for the appellant failed to exploit and which the court
passed over with but little deliberation. 7
The language of the information is sufficient$ to charge an offense under Sec-
tion 559.180. A lawful conviction in such a case requires allegation and proof of a
specific intent as an essential element of the crime.9 Since the crime charged is
assault "with intent to kill," the specific intent to kill must be present at the time
of the act. A specific intent to kill is a "particular or specific direction of the mind
against the life of the person assailed," 10 yet the trial court instructed the jury to
find appellant guilty if they found he made a malicious assault with intent to kill
or do some great bodily harm. It is the writer's opinion that the intent to do some
great bodily harm is something less than or different from a "particular or specific
direction of the mind against the life of another," and the instruction is, indeed,
broader than the information.", The jury is authorized to find appellant guilty of
malicious assault with intent to kill although they find his intent was not to kill,
but to do some great bodily harm.
The general assembly has made assault without malice but with intent to do
great bodily harm a felony,' 2 but it is a lesser offense than a malicious assault with
5. Point one of the argument in Respondents brief (page 17) states that the
information was based on Section 559.180.
6. The supreme court reversed the judgment because the trial court forced
Mrs. Dunbar to testify against her will and failed to instruct on accidental shooting.
7. Appellant's brief contained but one citation upon this point; neither
respondent nor the court cited any cases.
8. See State v. Crawford, 262 S.W. 700 (Mo. 1924) for an example of an
information sufficient in form and substance to charge a crime under Section 559.180.
An information was held sufficient in State v. Phelon, 65 Mo. 547 (1877) although it
failed to allege an assault since it followed the words of the statute.
9. State v. Cooper, 358 Mo. 269, 214 S.W. 2d 19 (1948), citing State v. Mar-
tin, 342 Mo. 1089, 119 S.W. 2d 298 (1938) and State v. Arvin, 123 S.W. 2d 182 (Mo.
1938).
10. 1 BURDICK, LAW OF CRIMES § 120, p. 140.
11. A person motivated by revenge or a desire to get information might put
out the eyes, pull the teeth or mutilate another yet be very careful to preserve his
life, even to the point of administering antiseptic after inflicting the wound. In such
a case an intent to do great bodily harm would be evident, but just as evident would
be the absence of an intent to kill.
12. Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.190 (1949): "Punishment for assaults.-Every per-
son who shall be convicted of an assault with intent to kill, or to do great bodily
harm, or to commit any robbery, rape, burglary, manslaughter or other felony, the
punishment for which assault is not hereinbefore prescribed, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five years, or in the county jail not
less than six months, or by a fine not less than one hundred dollars and imprison-
ment in the county jail not less than three months, or by a fine of not less than
one hundred dollars." A crime under either § 559.180 or § 559.190 is a felony.
Malice aforethough is a necessary element of a crime under § 559.180, but not under
§ 559.190. Also §59.180 requires the assault to be committed with a deadly
weapon or other means of force likely to produce death or great bodily harm, §
559.190 does not. State v. Garner, 360 Mo. 50, 226 S.W. 2d 604 (1950). To the
same effect see State v. Meinhardt, 82 S.W. 2d 890 (Mo. 1935) and State v.
Cooper, 358 Mo. 269, 214 S.W 2d 19 (1948)
19521 RECENT CASES
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1952], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol17/iss1/11
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
intent to kill as defined in Section 559.180.13 Upon an information charging assault
with intent to kill within the meaning of Section 559.180, accused may be convicted
of assault with intent to do great bodily harm under Section 559.190 and sentenced
accordingly. 14 But if such an instruction as instruction number one in the principal
case is correct, a person may be convicted of assault with intent to kill, as charged,
without having specifically intended to kill and it need only be shown that he was
guilty of a different crime than the one charged in the information.
It has also been held, in State v. Hardy,25 that an information charging an
assault with malice with intent "to kill or do some great personal injury or bodily
harm" is sufficient. An instruction was framed in the same language as the informa-
tion and the verdict was guilty as charged. The Supreme Court of Missouri, Leedy,
J., said that the words "great bodily harm" mean nothing more than "maim" as
used in Section 559.180 so that the information, instruction and verdict were all
proper under that section and judgment was affirmed. The precise point has pre-
viously been considered by the supreme court. In State v. Littler,"0 defendant was
apparently charged with an assault with malice with intent to kill as was appellant
in the principal case.17 There, as here, the jury was instructed to convict if they
found defendant intended to kill "or do him great bodily harm." There also the
verdict was "guilty as charged in the information," but judgment was reversed, the
court saying: "The verdict, read in the light of the instruction, does not indicate
whether the jury found an intent to kill as charged or an intent to do great bodily
harm which was not charged. It cannot be affirmed that the error in the instruc-
tion was not prejudicial." The important distinction between the Hardy case1 8 and
the principal case is that the information in the latter case charged only assault
with intent to kill or murder. Thus, the analysis used in the Hardy case is noV
applicable.
The other question which deserves consideration arises from the trial court's
ruling requiring Mrs. Dunbar to testify against appellant against her will and over
his objection. She had voluntarily signed the complaint against appellant, but at
the trial she positively stated that she did not wish to testify against her husband
and that she appeared as a witness only because subpoenaed.
The common law rule was that neither a husband nor a wife could testify in a
criminal proceeding against the other, 9 nor could either be prosecuted upon a com-
13. State v. Gill, 64 S.W. 2d 264 (1930).
14. In State ex rel. Dutton v. Sevier, 336 Mo. 1236, 83 S.W. 2d 581 (1935)
defendant was convicted of assault with intent to kill and sentenced to a twelve year
term in the state penitentiary. On appeal the judgment of the trial court was de-
clared absolutely void since defendant was prosecuted under § 559.190 and the
maximum penalty under that section is five years imprisonment.
15. 359 Mo. 1169, 225 S.W. 2d 693 (1950).
16. 186 S.W. 1045 (Mo. 1916)
17 In State v. Hardy, supra note 15, Judge Leedy, speaking of State v.
Littler says, "There the information charged an assault with intent to kill, under
the statute here involved .. "
18. See note 15, supra.
19. State v. Ulrich, 110 Mo. 350, 19 S.W. 656 (1892).
[Vol. 17
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plaint signed by the other.20 An exception to this common law rule was a prosecu-
tion of one for criminal injury to the other. In such a case the proceedings could be
commenced upon a complaint signed by the injured spouse 21 and such spouse was
competent to testify at the trial of the other.22 The reason for the rule has been stat-
ed to be one of public policy23-protecting the harmony and confidence of the mar-
riage relation. The exception has been based upon the grounds of necessity.24 If the
injured husband or wife were not allowed to swear out a complaint and testify
against the offending spouse many crimes against the peace and dignity of the state
will go unpunished.
The rule of the common law is in force in Missouri except where it/has been
changed or modified by statute.26 Section 546.26026 has been upon the statute
books in Missouri since 187727 and provides in part that "no person shall be incom-
petent to testify as a witness in any criminal cause or prosecution by reason of
being... the husband or wife of the accused .. . : Provided, that no such ...
wife or husband of such person, shall be required to testify, but any such person
may, at the option of the defendant, testify in his behalf...."
The Supreme Court of Missouri correctly held that Mrs. Dunbar should not
have been forced to testify against her husband against her will and over his objec-
tion. She was a competent witness either at common law or by reason of Section
546.26028 and was therefore competent to sign the complaint against appellant,
having done so voluntarily, but the ruling of the trial court forcing her to testify
was in direct conflict with the plain terms of the statute. When Mr. Justice Clark
interpreted "require" to mean "compel" and held that the prohibition extended to
any criminal cause, he was no doubt correct. However, the court then proceeded
to set forth some dictum which seems equally inconsistent with Section 546.260,
as previously interpreted by this court. The opinion states29 that "the preceeding
portion of the statute makes one spouse a competent, but not compellable, witness
20. State v. Berlin, 42 Mo. 572 (1868).
21. State v. Newberry, 43 Mo. 429 (1869).
22. State v. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388, 27 S.W. 1106 (1904). For a discussion
of what amounts to a criminal injury by one spouse to another, see 11 A.L.R. 2d
646 (1950). See State v. Vaughn, 136 Mo. App. 645, 118 S.W. 1186 (1909), to the
effect that breach of the peace is not a criminal injury. As to whether one spouse
can be compelled to testify against the other for criminal injury done, see cases.
cited in State v. Vaughn, supra.
23. See note 18, supra.
24. See note 19 supra.
25. Ex parte Dickinson, 132 S.W. 2d 243 (Mo. 1939).
26. Mo. REv. STAT. § 546.260 (1949).
27. Mo. Laws, 1877, p. 356, § 1.
28. No Missouri decision construing § 546.260 has been found where a wife has
suffered a criminal injury at the hand of her husband and is willing to testify against
him. In State v. Anderson, 252 Mo. 83, 158 S.W. 815 (1913), the wife was allowed
to testify in such a case over the objection of her husband, but no mention was
made of a statute. However, the case was decided some 46 years after §546.260
was made law. It seems clear that if the wife is willing to testify in such a case,
the husband's objection can have no avail.
29. 360 Mo. 788, 792, 230 S.W. 2d 845, 847 (1950).
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in any criminal charge against the other spouse; that is, he or she may, at his or her
own option, testify as a witness for the state." (Emphasis the writer's) Perhaps
this is the prevailing philosophy in view of more modem times and policies," ° but
it has not been the prevailing view in Missouri.
In construing this statute the Missouri courts have held that one spouse may
now testify on behalf of the other charged with a crime,31 but a husband or wife
may not testify against his or her spouse over the objection of such spouse except in
a prosecution for a criminal injury by one to the other. This has been specifically
decided in a prosecution for forgery,32 rape33 and assault with intent to kill.A4 Th
disability includes testimony by a third person as to extra judicial confessions made
by a wife against her husband,3 5 testimony by a third person as to a wife's hearsay
statements 8 and testimony before a coroner.37 It extends to common law spouses38
and continues after the marriage has ended in divorce.3 9 The privilege may be
waived by failure to object to testimony of the spouse.40 Thus, it can be seen that
the Missouri courts have held that the option is with the spouse on trial, not the
testifying spouse.4'
WALTER McQUIE, JR.
30. Professor Wigmore has criticized this privilege and suggests its complete
abolition. 8 WIGMORE, EviDE'cE 232, § 2228 (3d ed. 1940). Note also the vote of
the American Bar Association Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evi-
dence in favor of abolishing the privilege in all civil and criminal cases.
31. State v. Finklestein, 269 Mo. 612, 191 S.W. 1002 (1917).
32. State v. Willis, 119 Mo. 485, 24 S.W. 1008 (1894).
33. State v. Evans, 138 Mo. 116, 39 S.W. 462 (1897). In this case it is said
"The controlling question on this appeal is the alleged error in permitting the wife
of the defendant to testify against him." Defendant had objected to the trial
court's ruling permitting his wife to testify. Referring to § 546.260, the supreme
court said: "It (the legislature) had declined to relax or change the common law
so as to render the wife a competent witness against her husband in a criminal
prosecution of this kind. It permits her to testify for him at his option, but not
against him." This construction of the statute is further yet from the construction
given it by Judge Clark when he said a spouse may at his or her own option testify
for the state and is probably a little too broad in view of the express words of the
statute.
34. State v. Kodat, 158 Mo. 125, 59 S.W. 73 (1900). Here again the supreme
court reaffirmed the common law exception in referring to § 546.260 and said:
"They may testify for each other in criminal prosecutions, except as to confidential
communications, but not against each other." Judge Clark failed to comment on this
case in the opinion although both parties cited it in their briefs.
35. State v. Pace, 190 S.W. 15 (1916).
36. State v. Cooper, 358 Mo. 269, 214 S.W. 2d 19 (1948).
37. State v. Allen, 290 Mo. 258 ,234 S.W. 837 (1921).
38. State v. Harris, 283 Mo. 99, 222 S.W. 420 (1920).
39. State v. Kodat, note 32 snpra.
40. State v. Hill, 76 S.W. 2d 1092 (Mo. 1934).
41. See State v. Willis, note 30, supra. Defendant was convicted of forgery
and the "single point in the case" presented to the court was the action of the trial
court in permitting the wife of defendant to testify against him, over his objection.
The court said. "There has been no change of the common law rule in this state,
by legislative enactment, by which the wife is made a competent witness against the
husband, and against his consent, in a criminal prosecution of this kind." Citing§ 546.260.
5
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CRIMINAL LAw-DEFENSE OF INSANITY-BURDEN OF PROOF
State v. Barton1
Defendant was convicted of grand larceny. On appeal he alleged error in the
given insanity instruction, in that it placed upon him an undue burden. The trial
court instructed the jury that in order to acquit on the ground of insanity the ac-
cused must bear the burden of proving such insanity to their "satisfaction" or
"reasonable satisfaction." The supreme court, with two dissents, held this to be
reversible error.
In answer to the questions propounded by the Lords in regard to M'Naghten's
case in the year 1843 the judges answered that ". . . the jurors ought to be told in
all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane . . . until the contrary be
proved to their satisfaction; ... it must be clearly proved. ."2 This measure of
proof was reiterated in several later English cases 3 and adopted in most of the early
American decisions.4 As to the quantum of proof required to "clearly prove" insan-
ity there could well be room for disagreement. One court reasoned that an issue
cannot be said to have been clearly proved so long as a reasonable doubt remains.5
As a rule, the early cases in this country required a strong showing by the accused
that he was in fact insane. Many courts, as the one above, set his task at convinc-
ing the jury beyond a reasonable doubt 6
Apparently the reason for such a stringent requirement was the fear that many
crimes would go unpunished should insanity be more easily proved.7 Clever argu-
ments and confusing testimony, it was felt, could thwart the ends of justice with
the much used defense.8 The validity of this argument has been questioned, at
least so far as it would be applicable today considering the present state of psy-
chiatric knowledge. 9 The trend of the cases has been away from this harsh bur-
den,10 leaving only Oregon still requiring the defense of insanity to be proved
affirmatively beyond a reasonable doubt. The rule apparently only remains in that
state because of a statutory requirement to that effect."1
1. 236 S.W. 2d 596 (Mo. 1951).
2. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200 (1843).
3. Reg. v. Stokes, 3 Car. & K. 185 (1848); Reg. v. Layton, 4 Cox's C. C. 149
(1849); See Queen v. Nobin Chundler Banerjee, 13 B.L.R. Appx. 20 (India 1873).
4. Chaice v. State, 31 Ga. 424 (1860); People v. Klien, 1 Edmonds Select
Cases 13 (N. Y. 1845); Clark v. State, 12 Ohio Rep. 483 (1843); Carter v. State,
12 Tex. 500 (1854).
5. State v. DeRance, 34 La. Ann. 186 (1882).
6. State v. Brinyea, $ Ala. 241 (1843); State v. Spencer, 21 N.J.L. 196
(1846); State v. DeRance, supra n. 5.
7. It should be remembered that, at one time, no provision was made for the
confinement of those acquitted on the ground of insanity. 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
LAw § 47 (12th ed. 1932).
8. Spencer v. State, supra n. 6 at 206.
9. WEIHOFEN, INSANrrY AS A DEFENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW 156 (1933).
10. JONES, EVIDENCE § 535 (2d ed. 1926).
11. OREG. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 26-929 (Bancroft-Whitney, 1940). See critical
note, 8 ORE. L. REV. 190 (1929).
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A great many jurisdictions, including England under recent decisions, have
adopted what has come to be known as the English rule. That is, that the accused
has the burden of proving insanity, in the sense that he has the risk of persuading
the jury to that effect, not beyond a reasonable doubt, but at least by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.12 The difficulty comes in determining exactly what words
correctly convey to the jury the proper test to be applied. Most courts have held
instructions using the words "clearly prove" to be erroneous as requiring too high
a degree of proof.1 s The same for "to a moral certainty,"14 "most satisfactory,"'"
and "fully satisfied."' 8
In the case at hand the trial court instructed that the evidence of insanity
must "reasonably satisfy," and be found to the jury's "reasonable satisfaction."
In so doing the court followed a long line of authority which, in each case approved
instructions containing the same words.17 However in other cases instructions were
approved which contained the further phrase "by the preponderance or greater
weight of the evidence."1s The court in the principal case, with an evident pur-
pose to require as little proof as possible, disapproved of the given instructions.
Said the court: "We are convinced that the measure of proof required for an in-
sanity defense in a criminal case is the proponderance or greater weight of the
evidence; and that the sole requirement of the jury's satisfaction or reasonable
satisfaction imposes upon him a higher degree of proof than that of the prepon-
derance or greater weight of the evidence." The court went on to say that in their
opinion all reference to "satisfaction" and "reasonable satisfaction" should be
omitted in drafting instructions.
The earlier cases failed to draw any distinction between the different phras-
ings. State v. Sapp'9 and State v. Scott2" in approving instructions containing
"reasonably satisfied" and "by the preponderance or greater weight of the evi-
12. See digest of cases, WEIROFEN, op. cit..rupra n. 9 at 172.
13. People v. Wheden, 59 Cal. 392 (1881); People v. Precedio, 31 Cal. App.
519 (1916); State v. Hundley, 46 Mo. 414 (1870); Comm. v. Malton, 230 Pa. 399,
79 At. 638 (1911).
14. Bowden v. State, 151 Ga. 336, 106 S.E. 575 (1921).
15. Goosley v. State, 153 Ga. 496, 112 S.E. 467 (1922).
16. Malone v. State, 20 N.J.L. 146 (1897).
17. Baldwin v. State, 12 Mo. 223 (1848); State v. McCoy, 34 Mo. 531 (1864);
State v. Redemeier, 71 Mo. 173 (1879); State v. Schaefer, 116 Mo. 96, 22 S.W.
447 (1893); State v. Lewis, 136 Mo. 84, 37 S.W. 806 (1896); State v. Duestrow,
137 Mo. 44, 38 S.W. 554 (1896); State v. Privitt, 175 Mo. 207, 75 S.W. 457 (1903);
State v. Church, 199 Mo. 605, 98 S.W. 16 (1906); State v. Porter, 213 Mo. 43,
111 S.W. 529 (1908); State v. Barbata, 336 Mo. 362, 80 S.W. 2d 865 (1935). And
see State v. Smith, 53 Mo. 267 (1873).
18. State v. Klinger, 43 Mo. 127 (1868); State v. Hundley, 46 Mo. 414 (1870);
State v. Wright, 134 Mo. 404, 35 S.W. 1145 (1896); State v. Banker, 216 Mo.
532, 115 S.W. 1102 (1908); State v. Douglas, 312 Mo. 373, 278 S.W. 1016 (1925);
State v. Sapp, 356 Mo. 705, 203 S.W. 2d 425 (1947); State v. Scott, 359 Mo. 631,
223 S.W. 2d 453 (1949).
19. Supra n. 18.
20. Supra n. 18.
[Vol. 17
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dence" cited as authority cases approving only the shorter phrase.21 Other cases
give similar indication of a failure to draw a distinction. 22
The term "preponderance or greater weight of the evidence" is practically self-
explanatory. Bouvier defines it to be the "evidence which is more credible and
convincing to the mind."23 The term "satisfy," on the other hand, is generally
interpreted as requiring much more,24 and has even been looked upon as synonymous
with "beyond a reasonable doubt."25 Webster has defined it as "to free from doubt,
suspense, or uncertainty; ... to set at rest the mind of; to convince... .26 The
Missouri court has often disapproved of, though tolerated, its use in civil cases.27
If the burden is to be with the accused to prove this defense, the ruling of the
court seems theoretically wise. There can be little doubt that when the words
"satisfy" and "reasonably satisfy" are scrutinized they demand a more certain
finding than should be required. But perhaps some heed should be given to the
dissenting opinion which criticizes the reversal of the trial court when in all
probability the jury would make no distinction between the disputed terms. The
dissenting judges think that the opinion "wholly overlooks the fact that the test
of the correctness of an instruction lies not in the dose analysis which a critical
lawyer, or an appellate court, with the aid of briefs, arguments, and hours of re-
search may give to it, but how the instruction would be understood and acted upon
by the average juror who is wholly unskilled in the technicalities of the law."
In the federal courts and in nineteen states insanity is no longer an affirmative
defense. In the year, 1857, Brown, J., concurring in People v. McCann,"8 posed the
following question: "If there be doubt about the act of killing, all will concede
that the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of it; and if there be any doubt about the
will, the faculty of the prisoner to discern between right and wrong, why should
he be deprived of the benefit of it, when both the act and the will are necessary to
make out the crime?" That was the beginning. From it grew what is termed the
American rule.29 Theoretically insanity negatives criminal intent Criminal intent
is an essential element of crime which must be proved by the prosecution beyond a
21. State v. Duestraw, supra n. 17; State v. Barbata, su!pra n. 17.
22. State v. Klinger, s.upra n. 18; State v. Hundley, supra n. 18; State Smith,
.supra n. 17; State v. Wright, supra n. 18.
23. BouviEg's LAw DIc'roNARY (8th ed. 1914).
24. James v. State, 167 Ala. 14, 52 So. 840 (1910); Kelch v. State, 550 Ohio
St. 146, 45 N.E. 6 (1896); San Antonio & A. P. Ry. v. Graves & Patterson, 131
S.W. 613 (Tex. 1910).
25. Rolfe v. Rich, 149 Ill. 436, 35 N.E. 352 (1893) Indemnity Co. v. Hal-
laway 30 S.W. 2d 921 (Tex. 1930); and see Comm v. olandro, 231 Pa 343, Atl. 571
(1911).
26. WEBsTER's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1940).
27. Randolf v. Supreme Liberty Life Ins. Co., 359 Mo. 251, 221 S.W. 2d 155
(1949); and see Johnson v. Dawidoff, 352 Mo. 343, 177 S.W. 2d 467 (1944); Seago
v. N. Y. Cent Ry., 349 Mo. 1249, 164 S.W. 2d 336 (1942); Also see Rasp. v.
Baumbach, 223 S.W. 2d 472 (Mo. 1949).
28. People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58 (1857).
29. State v. Bartlett, 43 N.H. 224 (1861) seems to have been the first case to
squarely adopt the rule.
1952]
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reasonable doubt. Therefore, those courts adhering to the American rule require
that when the issue of insanity is raised the prosecution must prove the accused
sane in the manner that it must prove the other necessary elements of crime.8 0
What then happens to the presumption of sanity? A presumption is not in itself
evidence. It is but a shortcut in legal reasoning. Presumptions "assume the truth
of certain matters for the purpose of some given inquiry."," The presumption of
sanity relieves the prosecution of the necessity of introducing evidence of the
accused's mental condition until the issue is raised by the defense. All that is
usually required in this respect is sufficient proof to create a reasonable doubt.82
Though in one jurisdiction-Nebraska-the court has held that any evidence at all
will suffice.33
A leading case on this subject, and the first pronouncement on the question
by the Supreme Court of the United States, is Davis v. United States.a There
Justice Harlan wisely asked: "How ... upon principle or consistently with human-
ity can a verdict of guilty be properly returned if the jury entertain a reasonable
doubt as to the existence of a fact which is essential to guilt, namely the capacity
in law of the accused to commit that crime?" But for a statute requiring insanity
to be "proved," the Supreme Court of Canada would have adopted this view in
Clark v. The King."5 In State v. Redemier,36 Henry, J., dissenting, argued strongly
for the adoption of this less stringent rule in Missouri. "If a jury are to acquit on
a reasonable doubt of defendants guilt and one cannot be guilty if insane, by what
process of reasoning will a jury, having a reasonable doubt of defendants sanity,
come to the conclusion that they should convict notwithstanding the instructions
that a reasonable doubt of his guilt entitles him to an acquital?"
There are primarily two reasons why the majority of courts still require the
defense to prove insanity by at least a preponderance of the evidence. The first
is the fear that insanity might be too easily feigned and a less stringent rule would
open a door to unjustified acquittals.3 7 Secondly, the courts, giving too much weight
to the presumption of sanity, reach such a result as a matter of theory.38 In a
forcefully written separate opinion, concurred in by four other judges, Hollings-
worth, J. proposes that it is wrong to require an accused to prove his innocence
on the ground of insanity by even a preponderance of evidence. To do so, he says,
30. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. 353, 40 L. ED. 499 (1895)
and cases therein cited. WEIHOFEN, op cit., supra n. 9 at 158.
31. THAYER, EVIDENCE 314 (1898).
32. WEiHoFEN, op. cit., supra n. 9 at 161.
33. Torske v. State, 123 Neb. 161, 242 N.W. 408 (1932); Snider v. State, 56
Neb. 309, 76 N.W. 574 (1898).
34. Supra n. 30.
35. 61 Can. Sup. Ct. Rep. 608 (1921). See opinion of Anglin, J. at 622. See
notes in 3 AusT. L. J. 328 (1930).
36 Supra n. 17.
37. See supra n. 8. State v. Klinger, supra n. 18, for a refutation of this argu-
ment see Davis v. United States, supra n. 30.
38. Kelch v. State, supra n. 24; State v. Quigley, 26 R. I. 263, 58 At. 905(1904).
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"violates a basic concept of American and English jurisprudence: the presumption
of the innocence of every person charged with crime." Notwithstanding the court's
desire to lessen the defendant's burden, they fail to do so. Not, however, for one
of the above reasons, but because a statute of this state provides that when a jury
has acquitted a defendant on the sole ground of insanity they will further determine
whether he has recovered from his insanity, and if he has not so recovered then it
provides for his commitment to a state hospital.3 9 The court seems to feel that
this, -by implication, requires a factual finding of insanity. The same conclusion
was reached in State v. Murphyy40 which, though it involved a different problem,
considered the question here in issue in reaching its result. Obviously, said the
court, the statute "is incompatible with the theory that the jury may acquit when
they entertain only a reasonable doubt as to the sanity of the accused."
It is unfortunate that a procedural statute stands in the way of the adoption
by the Missouri court of the more liberal view. The trend of the cases has been in
this direction,41 and both justice and logic support such a change. Perhaps a statu-
tory revision will provide the solution.
If a change is made there is one problem that will have to be met. The court
apparently would not abolish the requirement that insanity be an affirmative de-
fense.42 What it would require would be that the defense sustain the burden,
though it must only create a reasonbale doubt as to sanity to authorize an acquit-
tal on that ground. Isn't this in effect the American rule? Whether the prosecu-
tion must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defense affirmatively
raise that same doubt, would seem of no consequential difference in practice.
Especially is this so when it is remembered that in all but one of the jurisdictions
following the American rule the defendant must produce enough evidence to create
a reasonable doubt before the presumption of sanity is rebutted and the state is
required to assume the burden of proof. 43 It would seem just, and less confusing,
39. Mo. REV. STAT. § 546.510 (1940): "Acquittal because of insanity, dis-
posal. When a person tried upon indictment for any crime or misdemeanor shall
be acquitted on the sole ground that he was insane at the time of the commission
of the offense charged, the fact shall be found by the jury in their verdict, and by
their verdict the jury shall further find whether such person has or has not entirely
and permanently recovered from such insanity; .
40. 338 Mo. 291, 90 S.W. 2d 103 (1936). Also see State v. Quigley, supra n.
38, and cases therein cited where similar statutes were construed to the same effect.
41. WEIHOFEN, o p. cit. su'pra n. 9 at 168; JoNE s, EvIDENCE, siUpra n. 10 §
2535. But see WIGMoRn, EvIENCE § 2501 (3d ed. 1940) who seems to think
otherwise.
42. State v. Barton, supra n. 1 at 602.
43. In Georgia and South Carolina the approved instruction is that insanity
is an affirmative defense to be proved by the accused by a preponderance of the
evidence, but that if the jury entertain a doubt on the whole showing, including
the question of insanity, they must give the benefit of that doubt to the accused
and acquit. Carr v. State, 96 Ga. 284, 22 S.E. 570 (1895); State v. McIntosh, 39
S. C. 97, 17 S.E. 446 (1893). However, the Georgia court seems to have tacitly
abandoned this seemingly inconsistent rule, in favor of a charge that the burden
is on the accused to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury. Carroll v. State, 204
Ga. 510, 50 S.E. 2d 330 (1948). Also see, Wilson v. State, 9 Ga. App. 274 (1911).
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to adopt the American rule in full, placing the -burden of proving all the essential
elements, including the voluntary will of the accused, upon the prosecution. 44
WILLIAM B. ANDERSON
INSURANcE-LIFE-AssIGNMENT TO ONE WmOUT AN INSURABLE INTEREST
Butterwortk v. Mssisppi Valley Trust Co.1
On February 8, 1935, one Butterworth took out a $100,000 ordinary life insur-
ance policy on himself naming one Tarlton, a business associate, as beneficiary. On
March 13, 1935, Butterworth, the holder of the policy, purported to make an abso-
lute assignment of the policy to Tarlton, the beneficiary, for the purpose of "set-
tling the accounts" between the two men. On February 10, 1936, Tarlton irrevocably
assigned the policy to the defendants as trustees of a trust set up by him, called
the "Tarlton Trust." Tarlton died in 1943. In 1944, Butterworth, the original
holder and "cestui que vie," purported to assign his interest in the policy to plain-
tiffs as trustees of the "Butterworth Trust." Butterworth died in 1947, and the
defendants, as trustees of the Tarlton Trust, collected the face amount of the policy.
Neither Butterworth nor the Butterworth Trust paid any premiums on the policy;
Tarlton and his assignee paid all of them from 1935. It was conceded that the
Tarlton Trust had no insurable interest in the life of Butterworth. The trustees
under the Butterworth Trust brought this action against the trustees of the Tarlton
Trust for an accounting of the proceeds of the policy. Plaintiffs contended that the
policy was assigned to Tarlton in the first instance as a security for a debt and that
the creditor may retain only the amount of the indebtedness then unpaid, plus any
premiums paid to maintain the policy. Plaintiffs also contended that the assign-
ment to the Tarlton Trust was void because it had no insurable interest in Butter-
worth, thus being a violation of the rule of public policy against wagering contracts.
A decree for the defendant trustees was affirmed, the supreme court holding that the
assignment to Tarlton was not given as security for a debt and that an assignment
to one without an insurable interest, made in good faith and not as a mere cloak to
cover a gambling transaction, is not against public policy and is valid.
It has long been settled in most states, including Missouri, that where an in-
sured (i.e., the person who contracts with the insurer) takes out a policy of insur-
ance on the life of another, the policy is void unless the insured has an insurable
interest in the insured life.2 It is equally well settled that where the beneficiary is
the active and moving party in procuring another to insure his own life, the policy
is void unless the beneficiary has an insurable interest in the insured life.8 These
44. Since the writing of this note the supreme court has again held an in-
struction almost identical with the one in the principal case to be erroneous as
imposing a higher degree of proof than the law requires. State v. Eaves 243 S.W. 2d
129 (Mo. 1951).
1. 240 S.W. 2d 676 (Mo. 1951).
2. Singleton v. St. Louis Mut. Ins. Co., 66 Mo. 63, 72 (1877).
3. Deal v. Hainley, 135 Mo. App. 507, 116 S.W. 1, 13 (1909); Whitmore v.
Supreme Lodge, 100 Mo. 36, 13 S.W. 495 (1889).
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well-settled rules were extended by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
leading case of Warnock v. Davis.4 In that case it was held that where one insured
his own life pursuant to a prior contract with a third party, who had no insurable
interest, which provided that the policy, when issued, should be assigned to the
third party, who would pay the premiums, the assignment was void. The decision
in Warnock v. Davis was unquestionably sound upon the facts there involved but
the opinion contained dictum which went far beyond the facts, to the effect that an
assignment of a life insurance policy is never valid unless the assignee has an in-
surable interest in the insured life. That dictum was overruled by the United States
Supreme Court in Grigsby v. Russell,5 a decision holding valid an assignment of a
life insurance policy to an assignee with no insurable interest. In that case a man
had insured his own life, without contract or plan to assign the policy, and, years
later, made the assignment in question. The dictum in Warnock v. Davis created
considerable confusion in the state courts. In Missouri it resulted in several con-
flicting decisions of courts of appeals which have left the law in a doubtful state for
more than sixty years. The decision now noted settles the law on the question. 6
The first Missouri case on the subject was McFarland v. Creatth. 7 In that case,
the holder took a policy on himself and made payable to himself. Before his death,
the holder assigned the policy to the defendant, who had no insurable interest in the
life of the insured. The court held that such an assignment made the defendant the
beneficiary and held the assignment valid, distinguishing between a case where the
policy is taken out by a person having no insurable interest in the insured life and
the case where the policy was taken out by the person whose life was insured him-
self and then assigned to one without an insurable interest. In the subsequent case
of Heusner v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,s the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that an
assignment to one without an insurable interest was void. In that case, the holder
assigned a paid-up policy worth $1500 at maturity for $342. The court said the
peculiar facts showed that the assignee was merely gambling on the life of the in-
sured. The court in effect said that the decision of McFarland v. Creatlh, supra,
was overruled by the Missouri case of Whitmore v. Supreme Lodge,9 a case which
did not involve an assignment. In the Wlitmore case, the policy was taken out by
the person whose life was insured but there was evidence that the beneficiary was
the active and moving party in the transaction. In the Heusner case, supra, the
4. 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881).
5. 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1909). In ruling on the precise question, Justice Holmes
wrote, "And cases in which a person having an interest lends himself to one with-
out any as a cloak to what is in its inception a wager have no similarity to those
where an honest contract is sold in good faith."
6. Neither the decision noted nor the present note is applicable to policies
of life insurance on the assessment plan in Missouri. As to such policies, Section
377.080, Mo. REV. STAT. (1949), provides, "2. Any assignment of a policy or cer-
tificate to a person having no insurable interest in the insured life shall render such
assignments void and of no effect."
7. 35 Mo. App. 112 (1889).
8. 47 Mo. App. 336, 343 (1891).
9. 100 Mo. 36, 46, 13 S.W. 495 (1889).
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assignee was, however, permitted to recover the amount he had paid for the policy.
Following the Heusner case, supra, subsequent Missouri appeals decisions permit--
ted the assignee to recover only the amount he had paid for the policy plus the
amount of the premiums he had paid.10 In these cases, the courts refused to apply
the assignment in good faith rule and usually said that an assignment to one who,
had no insurable interest was void.
In the case of Lee v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,"' the Kansas City
Court of Appeals seemed to return to the holding of McFarland v. Creath.2 In the,
Lee case, the assignee paid values for a policy of a paid-up value of $750. The court
upheld the assignment, recognizing the general rule that a policy secured by a bene--
ficiary who does not have an insurable interest in the life of the insured is void but
refusing to apply that rule to the case where the policy is obtained by the person
whose life is insured and later assigned to one without an insurable interest. Ir
Allen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,18 the Springfield Court of Appeals held that there was
no assignment of the policy there involved but intimated that even had there been,
the assignee would have had no interest in the policy except as to the premiums,
paid.
In Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Manthei, 4 the policy taken out by the
insured was assigned to the assignee as security for a note. The court said that
where a policy is assigned in good faith and without any intention that the assign-
ment is to be used as a cloak for a mere wager or gambling transaction, the assign-
ment is not against public policy, and the policy may be assigned by the insured.
The only qualification is that where the assignment is made to a creditor of the
insured as security for a debt, it is valid only to the extent of the debt it secures,
and the creditor must thereafter account to the beneficiary, or the insured's estate,
as the case may be, for any excess of the proceeds.
The Missouri Supreme Court, in deciding the principal case, relied upon the
language of the Manthei case, supra, as well as Grigsby v. Russell," in reaching its
result. Missouri now follows the weight of authority, which holds that an assign-
ment of a life insurance policy to one without insurable interest in the insured life
is valid to the entire extent of the policy if the assignment was made in good faith
and not made to cover up a gambling transaction.
MONTGOMEY L. WILSON
10. Tripp v. Jordan, 177 Mo. App. 300, 164 S.W. 158 (1914); Locke v. Bow-
man, 168 Mo. App. 161, 151 S.W. 468 (1912); Bruer v. K. D. Life Ins. Co., 100 Mo.
App. 540, 75 SW. 380 (1903); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Richards, 99 Mo. App. 88,
72 S.W. 487, 489 (1903); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Rosenheim, 56 Mo. App. 27, 34
(1895).
11. 195 Mo. App. 40, 189 S.W. 1195 (1916). See also Comment, 15 Mo. L.
REV. 68-71 (1950).
12. Supra, note 7.
13. 228 Mo. App. 18, 62 S.W. 2d 916, 918 (1933), citing Locke v. Bowman,
supra, note 10.
14. 189 S.W. 2d 144, 151 (Mo. App. 1945). Contra: Schneider v. Kohler, 219'
S.W. 2d 499 (Mo. App. 1947)
15. Supra, note 5.
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PROPERTY-ADvERSE USER-CLAIM OF RIGHT-AcTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF OWNE-
APPELLATE JURISDICTION-EJECTMENT AGAINST NoN-PossEssoR
Zinser v. Lucks'
In 1933 the defendants went upon the plaintiffs' land adjacent to the inter-
section of U.S. Highway No. 54 and the old Linn Creek Passover Road, and erected
two sign boards directing vacationers to the defendants' place of business, the "Art
Lucks Resort." The plaintiffs' property here concerned was unfenced woodland.
From 1933 to the time this action was brought in 1949, the defendants went on the
plaintiffs' land and maintained and repaired the sign boards, and kept the weeds
and brush cut to enable the sign boards to be plainly visible from the highway at
all times. The sign boards were erected without permission from the owners and
without knowing to whom the land belonged. Plaintiffs, residents of Chicago, Illi-
nois, brought an action of ejection in 1949 wherein the defendants by their answer
sought to enjoin the plaintiffs from interfering with their use, claiming an easement
by prescription. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' petition, and held that de-
fendants by prescription had a right of ingress and egress to maintain the two sign
boards, and permanently enjoined the plaintiffs from interfering therewith. The Mis-
souri Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision on the ground that the use
of the land by the defendants "was not of such character as to indicate to the own-
ers of the land that the lands claimed were used under a claim of right, and to put
the owner on inquiry as to the character of the use so as to charge them with notice
irrespective of whether they had actual notice or not."
No question was raised whether ejectment was the proper action. It would
seem that an action of ejectment would not lie in this case. Ejectment is an action
for the recovery of possession of land.2 Plaintiffs, to recover in ejectment, must
show that, at the time of the commencement of the action, the defendants were in
possession of the premises claimed.3 Here the defendants were not in possession.
Defendants were merely engaged in wrongful user. Adverse possessors of land for
ten years acquire title by adverse possession, instead of an easement by prescription.
The proper action would seem to be a suit to enjoin repeated or continuing tres-
passes. 4
It would seem doubtful whether the supreme court had jurisdiction in the
present case. The question of whether the supreme court has appellate jurisdiction
in actions of ejectment has caused some difficulty in Missouri. The Missouri Con-
stitution gives the supreme court jurisdiction in "cases involving title to real
1. 235 S.W. 2d 844 (Mo. 1951).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. § 524.010. (1949).
3. Mo. REv. STAT. § 524.080. (1949).
4. Evans v. Shaphard, 81 Ind. App. 147, 142 N.E. 730 (1924); Hobart-Lee
Tie Co. v. Stone, 135 Mo. App. 438, 117 S.W. 604 (1909); Kennedy v. Robinson,
104 Vt. 374, 160 Att. 170 (1932; 28 AM. JUR., lnjwUntions, Sec. 137; Note, 92
A.L.R. 583 (1934); Note, 32 A.L.R. 492 (1924). The cases hold that an action of
trespass is inadequate because of multiplicity of suits and because in some cases the
trespass if continued will ripen into an easement.
1952]
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estate."5 Numerous Missouri cases have held that a simple action of ejectment is
merely a possessory action and does not involve title to real estate.( But the cases
have also held that if the answer seeks an adjudication of title, then title to real
estate is involved." Tooker v. Missouri Power & Light Co.8 held that an action of
ejectment for possession of land on which the defendant claims an easement or
right of way does involve title to real estate so as to give the supreme court appel-
late jurisdiction. However, Ballenger v. WindesP overruled the Tooker case, "as well
as other cases holding likewise." According to the Ballenger case, before title to real
estate is involved the judgment must adjudicate a title controversy; the court ex-
plains this by quoting from Nettleton Bank v. McGaukery's Estate" that "the
judgment sought or rendered must be such as will directly determine title in some
measure or degree adversely to one litigant and in favor of another; or, as some of
the cases say, must take title from one litigant and give it to another." The court
in the Ballenger case concluded that a simple action of ejectment in which no title
relief is sought or granted merely involves a "judgment for possession," and though
it is necessary for the court to determine which party owns the land in order to
correctly decide the question actually up for judgment, title to real estate is not
involved in the constitutional sense. In the case of Cantrell v. City of Caruthers-
ville," decided in 1949, the Missouri Supreme Court agreed with the holding in the
Ballenger case, and affirmed the view that before 1943 in actions of simple eject-
ment in which no title relief is sought or granted title is involved only incidentally
or collaterally, the judgment does not directly determine title, and therefore title
to real estate is not involved so as to give the supreme court appellate jurisdiction.
However, the court then held that under the 1943 Missouri Code for Civil Pro-
cedure a judgment in the statutory action of ejectment is conclusive between the
parties as to title as to issues raised or which might have been raised,' 2 but this part
of the decision was given a prospective effect. It is yet to be seen whether this
doctrine affects the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court in actions of eject-
ment, After the Cantrell case it would seem that a judgment in an action of eject-
ment may or may not directly determine title, depending on the issues raised or
5. Mo. CONST. Art. 5, § 3 (1945); Mo. CONsT. Art. 6, § 12. (1875).
6. State ex rel. Edie v. Shain, 348 Mo. 119, 152, S.W. 2d 174 (1941); Wood
v. Gregory, 155 S.W. 2d 168 (Mo. 1941); Hyer v. Baker, 130 S.W. 2d 516 (Mo.
1939); Frederich v. Tobaben, 117 S.W. 2d 251 (Mo. 1938); Ballenger v. Windes,
338 Mo. 1039, 93 S.W. 2d 882 (1936).
7. Davidson v. Eubanks, 185 S.W. 2d 73 (Mo. App. 1945); Murphy v. Milby,
344 Mo. 1080, 130 S.W. 2d 518 (1939); Welsh v. Brown, 339 Mo. 235, 96 S.W. 2d
345 (1936). But cf. Hinkle v. Wood, 155 S.W. 2d 191 (Mo. 1941).
8. 336 Mo. 592, 80 S.W. 2d 691 (1935).
9. 338 Mo. 1039, 93 S.W. 2d 882 (1936).
10. 318 Mo. 948, 2 S.W. 2d 771 (1928) (leading case).
11. 221 S.W. 2d 471 (Mo. 1949). See Eckhardt, Ejectment or Trespass as
Determining Title, 15 Mo. L. REv. 379 (1950).
12. At common law a recovery in ejectment did not bar further actions of
ejectment even though between the same parties, having the same defenses, con-
cerning the same land. The title was not "directly in issue" and could be "collater-
ally and incidentally" tried again and again. 18 AM. JUR., Ejectment, § 124, p. 100.
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which might have been raised in the particular case, and therefore some actions of
ejectment involve title to real estate so as to give the supreme court appellate juris-
diction. But in view of the fact that in the principal case the defendant claimed
only a non-possessory right, and that ejectment probably was not the proper action,
the decision would seem not to foreclose further consideration of the problem of
appellate jurisdiction by the court.13
An easement may be acquired by prescription in the same general manner as
title to land by adverse possession."x In other words, the elements of adverse user
are substantially the same as the elements of adverse possession; the use must be
hostile and under claim of right, actual, open and notorious, exclusive, and continu-
ous for ten years.'9 The use must be open and notorious in order to give the owners
a reasonable opportunity to learn of the existence and adverse nature of the use and
protect their rights."' Actual knowledge 7 by the owners of such use is not neces-
sary if they had a reasonable opportunity to learn of the existence of the use claimed
to be adverse; knowledge will be imputed.' 8 A reasonable opportunity to learn of
the existence of the use is equivalent of knowledge of all that would be learned by
reasonable inquiry.19 According to the Restatement of Property,20 such reasonable
opportunity exists if the use is such as to be apparent upon an ordinary inspection
of the premises,2' or if it is of such common knowledge in the community that the
owners could learn of it by availing themselves of such knowledge.
13. The court in the present case held that "An easement implies an interest
in land which places the jurisdiction in the Supreme Court," citing Wood v. Greg-
ory, 155 S.W. 2d 168 (Mo. 1941). The court in the Wood case, however, following
the rule quoted in the Ballenger case, pointed out the fact that the Tooker case has
been overruled, and held that the facts of the case before the court (involving an
action of ejectment in which the defendant set up an affirmative defense of estoppel
and prayed for a determination of title) did not involve any actual controversy over
the title of the property and therefore transferred the case to the Springfield Court
of Appeals.
14. Schroer v., Brooks, 204 Mo. App. 567, 224 S.W. 53 (1920); Rice v. Wade,
131 Mo. App. 338, 111 S.W. 594 (1908); Power v. Dean, 112 Mo. App. 288, 86 S.W.
1100 (1905).
15. Hilgert v. Werner, 346 Mo. 1171, 145 S.W. 2d 359 (1940).
16. City of St. Louis v. Priest, 103 Mo. 652, 15 S.W. 988 (1890); RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY, § 458(c); note 18, infra.
17. If the owners have actual knowledge, even though the adverse user is
unaware that the owners have actual knowledge, and even though the adverse user
attempts to conceal such user, the use is open and notorious. RESTATEMENT, PROP-
ERTY, Sec. 458(c), Comment A., p. 1977 (1944). In accord, Mann v. Mann, 353 Mo.
619, 183 S.W. 2d 557 (1944); Norton v. Kowazek, 193 S.W. S56 (Mo. 1917).
18. Anson v. Tietze, 354 Mo. 552, 190 S.W. 2d 193 (1945); Johnson v. Moore,
346 Mo. 854, 143 S.W. 2d 254 (1940); Hilgert v. Werner, 346 Mo. 1171, 145 S.W. 2d
359 (1940); Miller v. Rosenberger, 144 Mo. 292, 46 S.W. 167 (1898); Key v. Jen-
nings, 66 Mo. 3$6 (1877); Scruggs v. Scruggs, 43 Mo. 142 (1869); Warfield v. Lin-
dell, 38 Mo. 561, 90 Am. Dec. 443 (1866); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, Sc. 458 (c),
Comments h. and i., p. 1977 (1944).
19. Johnson v. Moore, 346 Mo. 854, 143 S.W. 2d 254 (1940); Langford v.
Welton, 48 S.W. 2d 860 (Mo. 1932).
20. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, Sec. 458(c), Comment i., p. 1977 (1944).
21. In accord, Warfield v. Lindell, 38 Mo. 561, 90 Am. Dec. 443 (1866).
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Though the court points out in its opinion that actual knowledge is not neces-
sary if the adverse user's acts are so apparent that knowledge should be imputed
to the owners, the court's holding would lead one to believe that knowledge of the
existence and nature of the use will not be imputed in the case of unfenced wood-
land. The defendants entered the land and erected, maintained, and repaired two
sign boards, 10x 14 feet, adjacent to the intersection of a highway and road, and
they continuously went on the land and cut the weeds and brush, thereby rendering
the sign boards clearly visible from the highway at all times. It would seem that a
more open or notorious use could not be made.22 Nevertheless, the court held that
"the use in this case was not of such character as to indicate to the owners of the
land that the lands claimed were used under a claim of right,23 and to put the owner
on inquiry as to the character of the use so as to charge them with notice irrespec-
tive of whether they had actual notice or not." What the court apparently means is
that the use was not considered by the court as open and notorious so as to give the
owner a reasonable opportunity to learn of the existence and adverse nature of the
use.24 Though the court indicated that it thinks otherwise, the fact that the owners
were non-residents of Missouri would seem to be irrelevant.
The court also seemed to rely heavily on the Texas case of Burton v. Holland2l
which held that the act of putting a sign board on the land of another and main-
taining it and cutting the grass and weeds in front of the sign boards continuously
for the statutory period, was not sufficient to put an ordinary prudent person on
notice as to the intentions of the claimant to exclude the owners from the whole
tract. The Texas case, however, was concerned primarily with the question of con-
structive adverse possession-whether actual possession of a part is constructive
possession of the whole.26 Furthermore, an intention to claim title in the whole
tract is materially different from an intention to claim only an easement on the part
actually used, and it would seem that acts necessary to manifest such intention in
the one case are materially different than in the other.
22. It is conceded that ordinarily mere user of a right of way through un-
fenced woodland would not be sufficient to impute knowledge of the existence and
alverse nature of the use. 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 18, pp. 672, 673. The reason
for this is that such lands usually consist of vast stretches of undeveloped, unoccu-
pied territory such as prairies and forests, so vast in extent, that mere user of a
right of way rarely, if ever, is brought to the actual knowledge of the record owner.
Schroer v. Brooks, 204 Mo. App. 567, 224 S.W. 53 (1920). But, as has been pointed
out, defendants' user in the present case was more than mere user of a right of way.
23. The term "claim of right," when used in connection with adverse posses-
sion or adverse user, means the intention of the disseisor to appropriate and use the
land as his own to the exclusion of all others, irrespective of any semblance or
shadow of actual title or right. Tillman v. Hutcherson, 348 Mo. 473, 154 S.W. 2d
104 (1941); 1 AM. JuR., Adverse Possession, Sec. 187; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY,
Sec. 458, Comment d. (1944).
24. 235 S.W. 2d 844 at p. 850, the court in the principal case says,... "we hold
that the nature of the use and the situation of the parties under the facts in this
case was not such open, notorious, uninterrupted, and adverse use of the lands
sought to be acquired as an easement to give notice to the owners thereof of such
intentions on the part of the defendants."
25. 278 S.W. 2$2 (Ct Civ. App. Tex. 1925).
26. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.040 (1949).
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The decision in the principal case may be supported on two grounds not dis-
,cussed by the court. The defendant's testimony at the trial would seem to be fatal
to his defense: "Q. Then you don't claim any ownership of that land at all? A. No,
I don't." To acquire an easement by prescription the use must be made under a
,laim of right. Although there may be some question as to the meaning of the
word "ownership" as used in the question, the question and answer would seem to
negative any use of the land under the claim of right, and to amount to a present
-disclaimer of any interest in the land.2 7
The principal case might have been disposed of on the ground that a revocable
jicense to erect and maintain sign boards on unfenced woodland of the character of
the plaintiffs' land is implied from the custom and habits of the country.28 User
cannot be adverse so long as it has its inception in and continues under such an
implied license, and the statutes of limitation do not begin to run until there is a
Zdstinct and positive assertion of a right hostile to the owner and "brought home to





Husband and a third person were owners of certain lands as tenants in com-
*mon, but prior to this action the third person quitclaimed his half-interest to the
husband and wife. Husband brought replevin in his own name, not joining wife as
plaintiff, against defendant for allegedly removing fence wire and posts from this
property. The trial court entered judgment that the husband was entitled to the
-possession of this property, and defendant appealed. This judgment was reversed
by the court of appeals because plaintiff's proof failed to establish that the fence
was located on the land.2 In its opinion, the court noticed that plaintiff was not
the sole owner, saying: "There is no question but that at the time of this litigation,
,plaintiff and his wife owned the land."
On retrial, the lower court entered judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff, and
the defendant appealed a second time, contending that the judgment should be re-
27. Supra, notes 15 and 23. The possession (or use) cannot be adverse unless
the possessor (or user) intends it to be adverse. Stamper v. Griffin, 20 Ga. 312, 65
Am. Dec. 628 (1856); Stevenson v. Black, 168 Mo. 549, 68 S.W. 909 (1902); Pharis
v. Bayless, 122 Mo. 125, 26 S.W. 1032 (1894); Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59, 5
L.Ed. 398 (U.S. 1822).
28. See, e.g., McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127 (1922).
29. Williams v. Diederich, 359 Mo. 683, 223 S.W. 2d 402 (1949); Freed v.
Greathouse, 238 Mo. App. 470, 181 S.W. 2d 41 (1944); McCune v. Goodwillie, 204
Mo. 306, 102 S.W. 997 (1907). This would seem to mean that before a permissive
use can be transformed into an adverse use the owners must have actual knowl-
.edge of the user's hostile acts.
1. 234 S.W. 2d 805 (Mo. App. 1950).
2. 214 S.W. 2d 735 (Mo. App. 1948).
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versed because the plaintiff's wife was not a party. Defendant based this conten-
tion on prior Missouri decisions to the effect that "one who is not the sole owner of
chattels cannot sue in replevin to recover possession of them," and, "that all of the
owners must join in the suit."2
Although stating that the court was not bound by its remarks as to this point
in the first appeal, since it was not then in issue, the court did acknowledge that
they therein said the plaintiff and his wife owned the land at the time of litigation,
and in this second appeal treated the husband and wife as tenants by entireties in
a half-interest of the property the husband was seeking to replevy.4
In considering the defendant's contention, the court said: "We do not dispute
the rule that in replevin all ordinary5 persons must join as plaintiffs." But the court
rejected the defendant's contention, stating: "As they were tenants by the en-
tirety in the half interest in such land, the husband had the right to maintain an
action in his own name to replevin property taken from such land."0
At common law, the husband and wife were in legal contemplation but one
person, and the husband was that person, the legal existence of the wife being con-
sidered for most purposes as suspended during the marriage and merged in that of
the husband.7
The essential characteristic of an estate by the entirety in land is that each
spouse is seized in the whole or entirety and not of a share, moiety, or divisible
part.8 Each is seized per tout et non per my.0 Because of this, it has been the
policy of the law to prevent acts by either spouse which would have the effect of
destroying such unity. Thus the courts hold that in such an estate in real property,
one tenant by the entirety has no such right, title, or interest therein as may be con-
veyed or encumbered by his or her sole act, and that neither spouse alone, without
the consent of the other, can sell, mortgage, or encumber the property, or any part
thereof, or any interest therein. 10 It has been pointed out" that a tenancy by the
3. McCabe v. Black River Trans. Co., 131 Mo. App. 531, 110 S.W. 606
(1908).
4. Davidson v. Eubanks, 354 Mo. 301, 189 S.W. 2d 295, 161 A.L.R. 450
(1915); Peters v. Peters, 312 Mo. 609, 280 S.W. 424 (1926) (where the court said:
"It is true in this state, as at common law, that where real property is conveyed to
a husband and wife, and there are no limiting words in the operative clauses of the
deed, they take an estate by the entirety."). Also see: Kelly, Tenancy By The En-
tirety, 16 Mo. L. Rav. 183 (1951); Steiner, Tenants By the Entirety, 26 U. OF Mo.
BULL. L. SER. 46 (1923).
5. Emphasis added.
6. This in full is the reason assigned by the court.
7. 41 C.J.S. 394; Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67
(1918); Russell v. Russell, 122 Mo. 235, 26 SW. 677 (1894).
8. Note, 8 Mo. L. REv. 213 (1943).
9. Schwind v. O'Halloran, 346 Mo. 486, 142 S.W. 2d 55 (1940); Greene v.
Spitzer, 343 Mo. 751, 123 S.W. 2d 57 (1938); Ahmann v. Kemper, 342 Mo. 944,
119 S.W. 2d 256 (1938).
10. Baker v. Lamar, 140 S.W. 2d 31 (Mo. 1940); Samuel v. Frederick, 262
S.W. 713 (Mo. 1924); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bleedorn, 235 Mo App. 286, 132
S.W. 2d 1066 (1939).
11. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 430 (3d ed. 1939).
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entirety, though differing from a joint tenancy in some particulars, 2 is essentially
a form of joint tenancy, modified by the common law theory that the husband and
wife are one person.' 3
Turning now to personal property, the weight of authority is to the effect that
estates by the entirety may exist in personal property as well as in reality,14 and
Missouri recognized this in an 1871 opinion.15 The husband became absolute owner
(in law) of his wife's separate personal property, and may have had the exclusive
right to possession of personal property held by them as tenants by the entirety.
Consequently before the married women's acts, the husbands may have been the on-
ly person who could maintain replevin. However, with the passage of a married wom-
an's property act in 1875, relating to personal property, the situation takes on a
different aspect.' 6 In Rezabek v. Rezabek, the Missouri court recognized a ten-
ancy by the entire in personal property and said that during coverture each is
entitled to one-half of the rents and profits arising therefrom. Also it was pointed
out in Johnston v. Johnston8 that the statutes placing the husband and wife on the
same footing with regard to the right to have and hold personal property, in effect
abolished the legal unity which gave rise to estates by the entireties, without abolish-
ing the estate itself. In view of the foregoing, the question arises as to whether
today either tenant by the entirety, acting alone, may maintain an action of re-
plevin. 19
With reference to tenancies in common and joint tenancies, it is stated to be
the general rule that to enable one to maintain replevin, his right to the possession
must be exclusive.20 Therefore, where a chattel is owned by several persons, the
owner of an undivided interest cannot maintain replevin for it.s ' All of the owners
12. As seisin, possibility of severance, and the nature of the survivor's interest.
13. Tyler v. U.S., 28 F. 2d 887 (D. Md. 1928); Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass.,
403, 164 N.E. 613 (1929); Cf. Frost v Frost, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S.W. 527 (1906)
(where the court says such estates did not arise as a necessity from this theory
since it was possible for husband and wife to be tenants in common).
14. Woodard v. Woodard, 216 Mass. 1, 102 N.E. 921 (1913); In re Sloan's
Estate, 254 Pa. 346, 98 Atl. 966 (1916); Shields v. Stillman, 48 Mo. 86 (1871);
Rezabek v. Rezabek, 196 Mo. App. 673, 192 S.W. 107 (1917); Lomax v. Cramer,
216 S.W. 575 (1919). Also see cases collected in Note, 8 A.L.R. 1017 (1920) and
117 A.L.R. 915 (1938).
15. Shields v. Stillman, supra note 14, which in effect overruled Polk v. Allen,
19 Mo. 467 (1854) where tenancy by entireties in personal property was denied by
the court; Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. 68 (1873); see Steiner, Estate By The Entirety
in Personal Property, 30 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 60 (1924).
16. No Missouri decisions on this point found.
17. Mo. Laws 1875, p. 61; Mo. REv. STAT. § 451.250 (1949).
18. 173 Mo. 91, 73 S.W. 202, 61 L.R.A. 166, 96 Am. St. Rep. 486 (1903).
19. Bryan, Actions to Recover Chattels in Missouri, [1950 WAsH. U. L. Q.
553.
20. 54 C.J. § 52, p. 441.
21. Gossett v. Drydale, 48 Mo. App. 430 (1892); Bryant v. Dyer, 96 Mo. App.
455, 70 S.W. 516 (1902); Cox v. Morrow, 14 Ark. 603 (1854); McArthur v. Lane,
15 Me. 245 (1839); Corcoran v. White, 146 Mass. 329, 15 N.E. 636 (1888); Rein-
heimer v. Hemingway, 35 Pa. 342 (1860).
1952] RECENT CASES
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1952], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol17/iss1/11
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
are required to unite in the action, for the reason that all joint owners, unless there
is an agreement to the contrary whereby one has a right to possession against the
other part owners, are equally entitled to the possession of the property, and none
has the right to the immediate and exclusive possession of the same as against the
others. 22
In McCabe v. Black River Transportation Co.,23 cited by the defendant in
support of his contention, the St. Louis Court of Apepals said that one who is not
the sole owner of chattels cannot sue in replevin to recover possession of them and
that all of the owners must be joined in the suit. In that case, the plaintiff based his
claim on an unpaid mortgage executed to him by one who owned an undivided
eleven-twelfth's interest in certain barges. The court held that his failure to join
the party owning the remaining one-twelfth interest prevented his maintaining the
action.
In Upham & Gordon v. Allen,24 where a second mortgage brought replevin,
the defendant getting possession of personal property while it was in the possession
of an agent for the first, second, and third mortgagees, the court held that all of the
mortgagees should join in the action and that one or two could not maintain re-
plevin.
This general rule, and the reason supporting it, have been used by the courts
repeatedly in cases involving tenants in common and joint tenants, and it is submit-
ted that its soundness would apply equally to tenants by the entirety. In addition
to the reasons discussed, it would seem that more support could be found for such a
rule where tenants by the entirety are involved. Each of the parties is the owner of
the whole, and not of an undivided part of the property. Neither tenant has the
right to exclusive possession of the property, and the Missouri courts have con-
tinually asserted that in order to recover in an action of replevin, the plaintiff must
have a right to the immediate and exclusive possession thereof.25
Another factor which should be considered in this connection is that, under the
Missouri statutes on replevin,26 the prevailing party may elect to take either the
specific property involved, or damages for the value of the same.27 Also the pre-
vailing party is awarded damages in the event the property cannot be recovered
from the adverse party.28 In view of these provisions, it would seem that both the
22. Lisenby v. Phelps, 71 Mo. 522 (1880); Cross v. Hulett, 53 Mo. 397
(1873); Spooner v. Ross, 24 Mo. App. 599 (1887). In a considerable number of
cases, however, it has been held that there may be exceptional circumstances under
which one joint owner may properly bring, against a stranger, an action of replevin
for the recovery of specific property. For such cases, see 110 A.L.R. 356 (1937).
23. Supra, note 3.
24. 73 Mo. App. 224 (1898).
25. Pugh v. Williamson, 61 Mo. App. 165 (1895); Oester v. Sitlington, 115
Mo. 247, 21 S.W. 820 (1891); Steffen v. Long, 165 Mo. App. 254, 147 S.W. 191
(1912).
26. Mo. Rnv. STAT. §§ 533.120, 533.130, 533.140 (1949).
27. Woolridge v. Quinn, 70 Mo. 370 (1879); Tippack v. Briant, 63 Mo. 580
(1876); Hanlon v. O'Keefe, 55 Mo. App. 528 (1893).
28. Jones v. Jones, 188 Mo. App. 220, 175 S.W. 227 (1915); Bradley v. Camp-
bell, 132 Mo. App. 78, 111 S.W. 514 (1908).
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husband and wife who are tenants by the entirety should be parties to the action,
not only for their mutual protection, but also for the protection of the defendant.
Suppose the husband is the only party to the action and recovers damages from the
defendant in lieu of the specific property. There is no assurance that the wife, who
in the eyes of the law is also the owner of the whole property, will receive any of
the proceeds from the satisfaction of such a judgment. Furthermore, since the wife
was not a party to the action, the question may arise as to whether she can sub-
ject the defendant to a second action. Should the husband's action be deemed res
adjudicata as to the wife, even though she was not a party to that action?
The decision of the court in the principal case leaves important questions un-
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